Expert Witness:
Nick Troester on Deontological Ethics

Expert Witness — By on May 27, 2005 at 2:43 am



  • http://inkan.blogspot.com pgepps

    Nick, good lead-in for a discussion, but I keep waiting for the grit of the deontological approach: for instance, how *do* you interact with the hierarchy (Kant, after all, believes that true imperatives *will never* disagree with each other–flawed, in his formulation, but if we believe the rules are God’s rules, that should follow, no?) problems?
    Further, as a lapsed deontologist who still believes God’s commands have a priori status relative to our judgments, I’d wonder what you’d say to the following:
    Christian morality is a rule-consequentialism based on rules which we follow because God can “see down the tree” perfectly and has asserted that following His instructions lead to the best conceivable consequences. We accept this by faith, and proceed to live by His commands in a manner which has *given rise to* deontological ethics *in the default of* the eschatological conscience which forms the essence of Christian morality.
    In other words, deontological ethics is the post-Christian adequation of Christian morality, in much the manner that epistemology is the post-Christian adequation of Christian assurance that the universe is knowable because God wishes to reveal Himself through it.
    Cheers,
    PGE

  • http://troester.blogspot.com/2005/05/link-joe-carter-has-been-kind-enough.html Anti-Climacus

    Replies regarding deontology

    Joe Carter has been kind enough to allow me to do a post on deontological ethics. I’ll do my best to do replies to various objections, offer extensions, etc, here…

  • http://mt.ektopos.com/parablemania Jeremy Pierce

    Technically speaking, a consequentialist can accept three of your four claims. 3 is easy. Your relationship with members of your family will give you greater obligations to them, because such special obligations lead to better consequences. The world is better if we act as if we have such obligations. These are rules of thumb, of course, but they are obligations when those things lead to the best consequences, and they are real obligations. What justifies it is consequences, and the fact that sometimes there won’t be such obligations doesn’t negate 3 as you wrote it.
    Similarly, 4 is also true with standard formulations of consequentialism. They have one general duty, to maximize consequences. That general duty involves particular duties that will always be true when those duties lead to good consequences. When they don’t lead to good consequences, it’s simply not a duty, but that doesn’t mean there are no duties, and the fact that these aren’t absolute doesn’t mean they’re not duties.
    As for 1, consequentialists do think there’s one absolute. It’s always wrong to do something that leads to worse consequences than something else you could do. That’s an absolute for consequentialism, so you can’t say believing in absolutes means you’re not a consequentialist.
    The deontologist view is basically that there are moral constraints in addition to the concern for good consequences, such that in some circumstances it’s wrong to seek the best consequences. This doesn’t require seeing these constraints as absolute. Some deontologists think the constraints can be outweighed by very serious consequences, but it’s not simply a matter of weighing good and bad consequences. It would have to be a very seriously bad consequence, like the dying of all humanity, perhaps, for it to be ok to, say, kill an innocent deliberately and without consent.
    If you want to read a good account of how deontological theory might go, I suggest Shelly Kagan’s Normative Ethics. It’s intended as an upper level text for an ethical theory course, but much of it is devoted to exploring various elements of a deontological theory, because he thinks deontology captures commonsense morality fairly well.

  • http://www.leanleft.com Kevin T. Keith

    Nick:
    Interesting post; thanks for creating a dialogue. I’ve always liked your blog – this shows why.
    It wouldn’t be fair to offer an extended rebuttal, but I’ll make a couple of points in response:
    1) I don’t think your distinctions between deontology and teleology (or consequentialism) are that stark – consequentialists certainly regard their conclusions about moral acts as “part of the universe,” in the sense of resolving to absolute decisions as to right or wrong, they just regard those parts of the universe as affected by (“relative to”) other parts of the universe, which hardly seems strange; also, consequentialists (and most ethicists) also make a distinction between “the right” and “the good,” but see the relation between the two differently from deontologists (often expressed as: “the right precedes the good” for deontologists, while “the good precedes the right” for teleologists).
    2) Your substantive criticisms of utilitarianism – like most deontologists’ criticism – essentially boil down to complaining that utilitarianism suffers from the flaw of being utilitarianism; the problems you point out in it are simply fundamental features of the theory – not regarded as problems by people who seek the kind of moral theory utilitarianism is: it is not too simple to reduce moral comparisons to a single value, it is simply necessary – for one thing, we do that all the time in economics, law, and other fields, and for another, no one has solved the problem of comparing different qualities on incommensurable scales, so a single-scale ethic has the advantage of actually producing answers rather than stalemates when values collide; that utilitarianism is “relative” (to the facts and circumstances of the cases it considers – which one would think would be things moral decisions should be relative to) is not a criticism, in the minds of utilitarians – the theory was designed to give answers appropriate to individual cases, and to avoid always giving the same answer in disparate cases, as consequentialists do – so there is no damage done to the theory by an argument that shows the best outcomes come from “relative” standards – that was the point from the beginning; as to its being impractical, that is a serious problem, and one that has haunted utilitarians – but that does not seem to them a good reason to adopt a theory that is indifferent to circumstances and returns sub-optimal answers, simply because it is hard to follow the theory that gives better answers – the solution is to find ways to make the theory work.
    Finally, I would note – because it reflects on utilitarianism too – that Rawls did not “fiat” his moral principles. He argued that they would be the necessary consequences of an elaborate system of rational discourse about human values (the “original position” thought-experiment). Although Rawls is not an utilitarian, his thinking is very much like that of utilitarians who argue that the utilitarian principle is a natural result of thinking about, and trying to promote, human values. Neither case proceeds by fiat – both proceed by an argument about the necessary consequences of taking certain values seriously – leading, as theorists in both camps argue, inevitably to the one best moral system.

  • AndyS

    (I think it was Rawls who said that J. S. Mill had already written everything that anyone had to know about ethics which is rather confusing in light of Nick’s essay.)
    My general complaint about these abstract discussions (not especially about this one in particular) is I’m lost as to how one representative of a moral approach would act differently fron another when faced with a real-world ethical choice. Without some good examples it’s really hard to see if the outcomes are much different.
    So let me ask this question to Nick and Keith:

    Do you see moral philosophy as a way of

    1. establishing in one’s self a framework with which to drive your ethical choices?

    2. describing how human beings make ethical decisions?

    Is it a prescriptive or descriptive endeavor? Do people do moral philosophy in order to create the “best” framework to, say, teach our children how to make decisions? Or, is it to better understand why we make the decisions we do?
    The question is meaningful to me because I don’t think anyone actually refers to this or that moral philosophy in making their ethical choices, and as Kieran Setiya, a professional philosopher at U of Pittsburgh, says, “moral philosophers are not notably more virtuous than anyone else.” (See here, HT Brian Leiter.)

  • AndyS

    One commentor on Setiya’s blog said:

    To the extent that moral philosophers are experts at all, they are epistemic experts — that is, they have expertise about the domain. But, there is no reason to suppose that this gives them performative expertise, which is what we are looking for when we talk about moral excellence (as expressed in virtuous actions).

    (See the same link as above.)
    That’s the sort of thing I was getting at in my previous comment.

  • http://inkan.blogspot.com pgepps

    @AndyS–
    You didn’t ask me, but I “overheard,” so here’s my answer: every endeavor of theory has both a descriptive and a prescriptive component. The prescriptivist must describe what is and what should be, and then provide a compelling argument that we can and ought to move from one to the other; the descriptivist must describe what is, and then provide a compelling argument that we can and ought to act according to that understanding.
    The difference between the prescriptivist and the descriptivist is generally whether their descriptions include at the outset a conscience of the is/ought difference, or whether they view the is/ought as a cognitive problem (we don’t know what is well enough, so we err) or a moral problem (we know what should be, but we don’t do it).
    It’s a continuum, with clumps at the ends, but everyone engages the matter in both ways, if they’re doing any sort of compelling theory work.
    Cheers,
    PGE

  • AndyS

    PGE,
    Thanks. It seems to me that first you have to describe how we come to make moral decisions before you go on to prescribe them — although I’m not at sure who might agree with me here. Seems too that many go off and simply prescirbe a system and say “hey, this is the best, do what I do” with little motivation that their prescription is useful in the real world.

  • http://inkan.blogspot.com pgepps

    Andy,
    True dat. Theorists of all stripes are frequently justly criticized for “system-building.” They are, however, also often unjustly criticized for same. Seems to me every thought requires some degree of superstructure, some “grant me my premises, here,” if it is to be explicitly communicated in public discourse.
    I consider myself a prescriptivist, but would never take seriously a prescription which didn’t adequately describe the situations I see. To do so would be akin to showing up at the pharmacy with a piece of paper I picked up from the street.
    Of course, Plato would fill it no matter where I got it . . . (lurker bait)
    Cheers,
    PGE

  • AndyS

    PGE,
    I certainly agree with your well-stated comment: “Seems to me every thought requires some degree of superstructure, some “grant me my premises, here,” if it is to be explicitly communicated in public discourse.” Once we start that communication, of course, the arguments like the one’s Keith, Nick, and Joe are trying to make come into play. In a sense they are trying to establish their premises.
    My thought is that once we’ve established how people make their moral choices, then we can take a look at the world around us, and determine what set of rules (as in guidelines) are useful to help people make better ones. One of my premises is that people usually do what’s best for themselves based on
    1. what they know,
    2. how quickly they can access that knowledge,
    3. how well they understand the choices available to them,
    4. how good they are at projecting the consequences of their actions, and
    5. their ability to change their own patterns of behavior.
    Many groups (Christian, AA, NA, etc) help people with addictions (i.e. problem with #5) by showing people how they may have more choices available to them (#3) than they might have considered previously which offer different consequences (#4).
    This is the kind of thing I’m thinking about when saying that a description of how we make moral choices should preceed prescriptive ethics. Confusion around the descriptive aspect of morality can make efforts to prescribe ethical behavior fruitless. As I’ve said before, even though most of us can agree in principle to a small set of general rules, it’s putting them into practice where push comes to shove.
    Some groups have developed expertise in particular areas. AA’s “one day at a time” is actually part of an ethical system. Since many drinkers get lost in thinking about all sorts of depressing future scenarios, the guideline to consider just not drinking today is a powerful, positive ethical prescription for that circumstance. And it doesn’t require any appeal to ontology or epistemology. It works, it’s (hope you are lurking Gordon) pragmatic.
    Andy

  • http://www.leanleft.com Kevin T. Keith

    Do you see moral philosophy as a way of
    1. establishing in one’s self a framework with which to drive your ethical choices?
    2. describing how human beings make ethical decisions?
    There are traditional branches of moral philosophy that do both of these; they are know, not surprisingly (and in the language you yourself used), as “prescriptivist” and “descriptivist” ethics, respectively. Descriptivist ethics, however, is more akin to anthropology than to normative ethics – the fact that some people do do certain things does not make them morally right, even for a “natural law” ethicist, an “evolutionary ethicist”, or a cultural relativist (though the cultural relativists sometimes forget that).
    Most of what most people call “moral theory” is prescriptivist, or at least attempts to lay the groundwork for prescription. It tells us what we should do or how we should behave in order to be moral.
    As for whether anyone consciously refers to their adopted moral theory in making real-world decisions, I should hope they do. Of course, most decisions with moral implications are pretty straightforward (“should I pay for these groceries or steal them?”; “should I push that little old lady in front of that oncoming bus or not?”) – they don’t really require much extended analysis, so the thought process that goes into them is more or less automatic. This is not to say that moral theory does not apply – it just doesn’t require anyone who has a reasonably competent understanding of it to give it a lot of thought in most cases, any more than a musician thinks about music theory while playing a concert, or a baseball manager thinks about the infield fly rule while calling a play – but the underlying theory is fully in play in all these cases.
    More complicated cases do call for conscious theorizing, however. Perhaps not everyone has the mental skill or the moral discipline to handle them correctly – that is why we refer to our most respected and highly-trained authorities in difficult cases. But I can testify that people do refer consciously to formal moral precepts, and wrestle with them quite seriously, when confronted with difficult problems. In my own field, medical ethics, I have seen many cases in which caregivers and patients or family members were torn over making a decision about a particular case – and the discussions that ensue rely heavily on formal concepts of medical ethics that are promulgated by philosophers and accepted within the profession: “autonomy,” “beneficence,” “personhood,” and so forth. These concepts are brought into real, and very practical, effect by people who agonize over what they imply for particular cases. I have always been impressed by the sincerity, and very often the sophistication, with which rather abstract principles of ethics are considered, and their relevance evaluated, by people who are not professional philosophers but who take the notion of principle-guided reasoning very seriously and are willing both to grapply strenuously with it and be guided by it in their decisions.
    I remember a man, from a very conservative family and culture, who had a severely brain-damaged infant son and who said spontaneously, using a term nobody, to my knowledge, had used in his presence previously: “I am afraid my son is not becoming a .” I remember a doctor almost sobbing as he complained that he had no good clinical options for an elderly patient who was slowly dying, saying he feared the continued treatment was causing the patient harm with no benefit but that he felt that discontinuing treatment would violate his duty toward her. Both these people were consciously – and to some degree intuitively – invoking formal moral concepts to frame the problem they faced; in both cases formal discussions with ethicists, caregivers, and others built on these concepts to arrive at a practical solution. I believe the same thing happens in many other contexts, and I hope it happens in people’s private lives as well (it does in mine).
    Finally, as to whether moral philosphers are moral exemplars, as someone already pointed out, there is no reason to think that understanding something means you will be good at applying it – or willing to do so. “Those who can, do; those who can’t . . . !”

  • AndyS

    Kevin, thanks for the thoughtful reply. My favorite philosophy professor, Margorie Clay, progressed to department chair and then to the position of ethicist at Mass. General. Your field, medical ethics, is a great destination for a philosophy student or as it turns out a professor.

    As for whether anyone consciously refers to their adopted moral theory in making real-world decisions, I should hope they do.

    I hope so too and have the further hope that they’ve adopted their choosen theory — not because their parents or another authority taught it to them but — because they have tested it, seen its value, and have a deep understanding of why it’s a good guide to ethical behavior. I’m not so sure many people do that.

    I can testify that people do refer consciously to formal moral precepts, and wrestle with them quite seriously, when confronted with difficult problems.

    I agree. Perhaps I’m too cynical, though, in thinking that what this amounts too most of the time is refering to moral precepts that are based on a theory that is neither well-undersstood nor paticularly sound.

    More complicated cases [of moral dilemmas] do call for conscious theorizing, however. Perhaps not everyone has the mental skill or the moral discipline to handle them correctly – that is why we refer to our most respected and highly-trained authorities in difficult cases.

    Yep, and here my cynicism rears its ugly head again. Most folks have no more of a clue about terms like deontological, epistemology, ontology, etc. than how to do brain surgery. If they have someone like you around to help guide them through difficult decisions about their loved ones in the hospital, they are very fortunate, but that is the exception not the norm. So they must fall back on their favorite authority or go with their own inexpert judgment which thankfully works pretty well most of the time.
    Looking at the timestamps, you were probably composing your last comment when I posted the one just above it. One of the things that I was trying to get at there was that, to make a moral philosophy generally effective, it has to be
    1. accessible to the general public so appeals to authority are minimized, if not unnecesarry, and
    2. descriptive first(at least in the sense of the example I gave) so as to provide a reasonable background for whatever it then prescribes.
    PGE made a fine point that applies here about enabling communication which is a natural prerequisit for moral theory to be useful in the world. That utility is a key concern of mine.
    And example of my approach: The typical evangelical prescriptive ethics works as far as I can tell against a descriptive background of “all people are sinners” which is so weak in explanatory power that the rest of their program is motivated solely by argument from authority where “the authority” is a particular interpretation of the vast number of ambiguous and sometimes contradictory statements in the Bible. Consequently most of us do not find their prescriptions compelling.

  • JCHFleetguy

    Hey Andy

    The typical evangelical prescriptive ethics works as far as I can tell against a descriptive background of “all people are sinners” which is so weak in explanatory power that the rest of their program is motivated solely by argument from authority where “the authority” is a particular interpretation of the vast number of ambiguous and sometimes contradictory statements in the Bible. Consequently most of us do not find their prescriptions compelling.

    Since I find this statement so far away from my ethics – I thought I might sort out where I just misunderstand you – or you might misunderstand me.
    First of all, the root of my presciptive ethics is the “all people are sinners despite knowing the right thing to do”. In other words, our conscience (Law of Human Nature of Lewis) and/or morals (descriptive ethics) are not capable of keeping any of us completely in line for even a whole day.
    Next, I recognize the authority I will quote because of an empty tomb. If Christ is not risen, the New Testament at least is junk and christianity a waste of time. Nothing new morally (moral teachers tend to reemphasize the same truths anyway) and Christ, as Lewis said:

    . . . would either be a lunatic-on a level with the man who says he is a poached egg–or else he would be the Devil of Hell . . . shut Him up for a fool, you can spit at Him and kill Him as a demon

    Third, I do not feel “foolish” relying on authority:

    I have explained why I have to believe that Jesus was (and is) God. And it seems plain as a matter of history that He taught His followers that the new life was communicated in this way. In other words, I believe it on His authority. Do not be scared by the word authority. Believing things on authority only means believing them because you have been told them by someone you think trustworthy. Ninety-nine per cent of the things you believe are believed on authority. I believe there is such a place as New York. I have not seen it myself. I could not prove by abstract reasoning that there must be such a place. I believe it because reliable people have told me so. The ordinary man believes in the Solar System, atoms, evolution, and the circulation of the blood on authority–because the scientists say so. Every historical statement in the world is believed on authority. None of us has seen the Norman Conquest or the defeat of the Armada. None of us could prove them by pure logic as you prove a thing in mathematics. We believe them simply because people who did see them have left writings that tell us about them: in fact, on authority. A man who jibbed at authority in other things as some people do in religion would have to be content to know nothing all his life.

    Finally:

    “the authority” is a particular interpretation of the vast number of ambiguous and sometimes contradictory statements in the Bible.

    Before I was a christian I trotted that line out myself. I know you do not mean it that way but this statement is kind of insulting. I’ve read and studied the Bible from cover to cover. It hangs together quite well. And people have been hammering at its “ambiguities” and “contradictions” for 1500 or so years. Admittedly, we work hard to understand it better – and in that sense it is the most read, analyzed, and generally picked apart book ever written. My online study aides include 23 translations (plus one in Latin), 11 commentaries, 4 concordances, 6 dictionaries, a Bible encyclopedia, 2 lexicons (Greek and Hebrew), and a History. I can almost guarantee that whatever authority you might rely on for your prescriptive ethics has not been so studied.
    Now of course the prescriptions will not be compelling unless you accept its authority – which rests in Christ Risen. And of course, I cannot blame you for that – I wouldn’t either in your situation.

  • http://inkan.blogspot.com pgepps

    @AndyS–
    This has been a very interesting discussion, so I’d hate for us to all “choose up sides” and narrow our options prematurely. That said, I’ve happily agreed with you (and agree partially with Kevin) about a couple points, now I’d like to disagree with you.
    Or rather, to *partially* disagree with you. Let me concede at the outset that your complaint against evangelical public discourse on ethics is often dead-on when folks are, say, trying to articulate to a non-believer the authority of Scripture. That’s like explaining to a Canadian living in the US the overriding importance of their submission to Ukrainian law. It’s totally non sequitir.
    Now, however, I get to disagree a bit with your understanding of evangelical Christianity. Strictly speaking, you are correct that we do proceed from authority. We had better, since our cornerstone of belief is that God exists and has declared Himself to us. If we don’t buy that, we should pack it up and move on.
    That said, the “sin” of “all have sinned” is not a matter of ethics at all. Ethics come into play only *because* all have sinned. The “sin” of “all have sinned” is precisely in rejection of the God Who evangelicals have been led to submission to.
    God’s moral universe has two overriding imperatives for us: “Love God” and “Love your neighbor” (where “neighbor” is understood to mean anyone I have any ability to treat lovingly). The elaboration of these comes as a result of our (fallen, fallible, rationalizing) inability to adequately define the content of “love.” That is, God commands us to do these things, and He tells us how.
    God’s instructions, however, are not for the unbeliever. You are entirely free of them, though I do not envy you that state, if you are an unbeliever. Ethics are not your problem, at all–the fact that you prefer to be an enemy of God rather than His friend/child/servant (sorry, those *don’t* contradict each other) is the problem.
    Evangelicals who don’t portray that message adequately, but instead attempt to impose on the unbeliever the conclusions of an argument from authority whose premises the unbeliever fails to acknowledge, are deserving of your criticism. However, they are so by virtue of being *faulty* representatives of their faith, not of speaking the Scriptures well.
    Cheers,
    PGE

  • JCHFleetguy

    PGE
    Very nice

  • http://inkan.blogspot.com pgepps

    Thanks.
    I see we had roughly the same thought. I felt redundant when I hit “post,” but thought it might do some good to have the conversation continue, even to have similar thoughts worded two ways.
    Non-recognition of authority, of course, doesn’t make the authority go away. I just means there’s no basis for suasion, and it’s misguided to attempt it.
    Cheers,
    PGE

  • http://inkan.blogspot.com pgepps

    I’d really love to see Nick hop in again, here, too. He did a great job starting the ball from his line, the replies are in and are cogent, and I’d really like to see the discussion advanced. There’s meat here, good meat that we can profit from chewing.
    Cheers,
    PGE

  • AndyS

    PGE and JCH: Both of you agree that “God’s instructions, however, are not for the unbeliever,” for which I thank you. The statement at the conclusion of my previous comment was intended to explain how a nonbeliever views evangelical ethics, not to challenge their veracity.
    some minor points
    JCH wrote,

    [the Bilble] is the most read, analyzed, and generally picked apart book ever written…. I can almost guarantee that whatever authority you might rely on for your prescriptive ethics has not been so studied.

    I don’t want to start a “mine is bigger than yours” competition, but will note that Buddhist texts precede the Bible by nearly 100 years and have been studied ever since. They are not, however, what I rely on for my prescriptive ethics.
    PGE said, “… the “sin” of “all have sinned” is not a matter of ethics at all. Ethics come into play only *because* all have sinned. The “sin” of “all have sinned” is precisely in rejection of the God Who evangelicals have been led to submission to.
    Perhaps this is a quibble, but it seems like the kind of sin you describe here is especially a matter of ethics, sort of the background against which an evangelical submits to God and accepts His moral prescriptions.
    a short editorial
    PGE wrote: I’d hate for us to all “choose up sides” and narrow our options prematurely.
    I appreciate your sentiment while also noting that we have each choosen our sides on the major themes. I’m plugging away trying to understand the evangelical point of view and hoping to build a bridge of understanding for “atheistic pragmatic naturalism” — not to convert or be converted but merely to get beyond the false and often mocking characterizations of either side. I think there is great worth in this endeavor. Given the 1000+ hits a day this blog gets, when Joe recently said that people like me must be either hedonists or nihilists I was dismayed. It’s not like a passing comment dropped jokingly in a hallway converation at work. No, this is a statement presented as fact from a man who at least some take as an authority and even those that don’t will integrate a few of his sound bites into their thinking to the detriment of the wider dialog between people who live and work together in the same society.
    I know this cuts both ways. Evangelicals have long born the cross of having their beliefs falsely characterized and mocked, behaviors that in my ethical system are wrong generally and in public discourse especially. The more we can do to stamp out the false memes spinning through the blogosphere and elsewhere, the better chance we have at building up true understanding of each other and getting on with solving real problems.
    Even with this generous intent from all sides, however, we find we have conflicting beliefs, can still say things about each other that can offend, and our understanding remains incomplete.
    a final note
    I appreciate the way you guys go about witnessing your faith. It expands in a positive way my conception of evangelicals.

  • JCHFleetguy

    AndyS,
    Thanks, I like chatting with you too. The one point that is probably not true (or should not be) of most evangelicals:

    No, this is a statement presented as fact from a man who at least some take as an authority

    I take the Bible as authority UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT [but have a bunch of tools around if translation becomes an issue]. I have never considered taking Joe, (or Pat Robertson, or Falwell, Dobson, etc.) or the minister I listen to every Sunday on authority [Well once with the minister - an action I may end up regreting]. I am very “Buddhist” in the sense that at least with humans they must first get through a “does my experience bear this out” filter; then the Biblical one. Then, in a very serious problem, I will seek many counselors.
    Evangelicals should be guruless – other than Christ (God, Holy Spirit). Because we consciously keep away from legalism and dogma layered on our theology by men – we ideally have a tougher road. We are required to arrive at the truth of God for our lives and actions in a very non-dogmatic way; but not free as the Buddhist would be from rejecting scripture and canon if it conflicted with our own understanding. Some consider this a crutch – myself an anchor; and a protection from “the world, my flesh, and satan” corrupting me.
    Not to say, as you did, that “some” will quote Joe. I quote Lewis alot – but not because I take him on authority; but because he says what I believe better than I do.
    Somebody may at some point quote something I say here, or elsewhere – but I hope they never do that on authority.

  • http://www.evangelicaloutpost.com Joe Carter

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